SVR Consultant Kirpichenko Intelligence, Spies, Past Contacts with CIA Directors
VREMYA NOVOSTEY (Moscow)
Monday, December 20, 2004
Interview by Nikolay Poroskov of Consultant to the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Lt-Gen Vadim Kirpichenko on the role of intelligence in the world, spies past and present and his past contacts with directors of the CIA: "By Violating the Laws of Other Countries, We are Protecting Our Own."
(FBIS Translated Text)
"By Violating the Laws of Other Countries, We Are Protecting Our Own."
Interview by Nikolay Poroskov
Today, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) is celebrating its latest anniversary. Speaking about a few pages from the history of this special service with Vremya Novostey correspondent Nikolay Poroskov is the consultant to the director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Lt-Gen Vadim Kirpichenko, past director of Directorate "S" (illegal intelligence), and later deputy director of foreign intelligence.
(Poroskov) -- You are the only one of our intelligence agents who has met with seven directors of the CIA. One of them, William Colby, called you a friend and colleague. How did you manage to receive such a flattering assessment from your primary adversary? And what sort of people are these directors of the CIA?
(Kirpichenko) -- Naturally, "friendship" applies to the latest period, when we began to actively establish partnership relations. National intelligence will always exist, there will always be competition and confrontation, however, there are issues that would be impossible to resolve without partnership. These would include terrorism, money laundering, nuclear weapons proliferation, the drug mafia... We began to encounter these "terrible monsters," as they seemed to us before. It worked out that the director of our service entrusted me to provide hospitality to the heads of the CIA. I met up with Colby at a variety of international conferences devoted to the future of intelligence and established a good relationship with him. He told me many interesting things, and he called himself a dissident in the CIA. Indeed, they have no love for him there since he tried to place this department under the control of the Congress, he was the author of a number of laws that limited the CIA's activities, primarily with regard to "bumping off" people.
Another acquaintance of mine, Stansfield Turner, is also considered a person that is not very loyal to the CIA, since, being a four-star admiral, he wanted to instill military order and discipline there. The CIA directors turned out to have the makings of good bureaucrats (in the best sense of the word), with a very good memory, not nervous. They so cunningly carried on a conversation that any answer you gave to a question would give them satisfaction.
(Poroskov) -- Today in the American intelligence structures, major changes are underway, the likes of which have not been seen since the creation of the CIA in 1949. What does the SVR expect to come from these changes?
(Kirpichenko) -- What all of this might portend for Russian intelligence is difficult to say at this point. However, the Americans can now see one thing clearly: their intelligence services are ineffective, since the events of 11 September were prepared for on US territory, and for a rather long time at that, with dozens of people taking part. The reorganization of the system is meant to make sure that something like that never happens again: so that not a single alarm signal is missed, so that the departmental barriers between the intelligence services become a bit thinner. However, the director of the CIA is still the senior operational chief over the rest.
(Poroskov) -- The CIA is under the control of the Congress. But under whose control is the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service?
(Kirpichenko) -- That is an interesting question. From the moment of its creation on December 20, 1920, and up until 1992, we operated in a state of complete lawlessness. Generally speaking, there are very few laws on intelligence activities. Legislation is more or less developed in the US, in all of the European civilized countries there are laws that regulate intelligence activities to a certain extent. Before, we violated the laws of the country in which we were working (which is natural), and we were not protected by any of our own laws. Therefore, when the Soviet Union began to collapse and ultimately disintegrated, when the KGB was disbanded, Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov quickly understood the tragedy of our situation, and we began to work with the parliamentarians and military intelligence to prepare a draft law "On Foreign Intelligence Activities." On June 8, 1992, that law was adopted. Now, when we violate the laws of another country, at least we are protected by our own.
We are under the control of the president and his administration, because intelligence is directly subordinated to the president and only the president. However, various commissions and committees in parliament also have a right of control that is not total. For example, the Budget Committee knows how much money we spend and under what articles. The leaders of intelligence are invited to the committees (for security, for international affairs) and Duma commissions discuss our activities. However, operational affairs are the prerogative of the president.
(Poroskov) -- I have always been troubled by the fact that the people from the parliamentary committees who control your intelligence service, who possess information that is "not for all ears," are still temporary persons: if they are not reelected, they take that information with them...
(Kirpichenko) -- They do not know any agents, nor do they know about any specific operations. And they do not need to know. They are aware of the primary areas of our activities that are also written into the law: political intelligence, scientific and technical, economic security, domestic security... Ecological security is a relatively new area.
(Poroskov) -- Does information obtained through intelligence always become reality in the form of concrete actions by the state?
(Kirpichenko) -- Our information has always been governed by our chiefs. They might tell us: No, no. that would upset Leonid Ilich.
We don't need to give out that information. Now we tell it like it is, we report to the top people and take responsibility for our information.
The "feudal right to the first night" has emerged here, i.e. the ability to report directly to the president. Intelligence is improving. It took 23 years from the moment of the founding of the VChK in order to see the need for an analytical service: it was created in the second half of 1943, and prior to that information was forwarded in "live" form": "Agent 'X' said..." Without an analytical service, intelligence was not able to flow from one day to the next, it was rife with disinformation.
But the intelligence report is only half the picture. Will the president, the government be in a position to do anything based on the material contained therein if it is a hundred times accurate? What if the economic ability to bring to life what intelligence has been reported is not there? Since the early 70s of the last century, the USSR began to lag noticeably behind in its economic development and it was impossible for us to immediately reproduce something, it was done selectively. But intelligence obtained almost everything that was needed: models, documentation.
(Poroskov) -- When possible, the intelligence community helps out its associates who have gotten in trouble. However, Aldrich Ames who did so much to uncover "moles" inside the SVR and GRU remains behind bars. Has the leadership of your service given the president any recommendations to exchange Ames for one of the guys caught by our counterintelligence?
(Kirpichenko) -- Indeed, why not make an exchange? But there are many issues here. Does Ames want this? Understand, there is no communication with him in order to discuss this issue. But it is a vital one. To my knowledge, the question of an exchange has not been discussed.
(Poroskov) -- Nevertheless, today the SVR acknowledges that Ames cooperated with it? Previously this question was left blowing in the breeze.
(Kirpichenko) -- The fact of this cooperation was acknowledged by Primakov way back when, but then the topic never came up again for some reason. I think that Ames could have turned in Kalugin, our "excellent" traitor. In the press there was a great deal of discussion regarding his treason, but in June of last year the Moscow Municipal Court sentenced Kalugin in absentia to 15 years imprisonment in a maximum security penal colony under the article "state treason."
(Poroskov) -- It seems to me that as the miner's profession is invariably connected to coal dust, so the spy's craft is to treason. But in recent years for some reason nothing has been heard of any traitors. Have they ceased to exist?
(Kirpichenko) -- When our one system died, but the second had not yet been born, some traitors preferred to flee to their masters. You are correct in that on the front lines, when an intelligence agent crosses paths with counterintelligence agents sometimes he ends up in a situation that he can't get himself out of. I have discussed the nature of treason with former directors of the CIA. Treason is a conglomeration of various types of vices, weaknesses. It is psychological instability, family discord, running from a wife one doesn't love, forever worrying about one's health -- one imagines that he is terminally ill and can only be healed in another country. Some have appealed to the enemy in the hopes of curing their child who suffered at Chernobyl. Some have even resorted to treason to get their boss into trouble. And finally, money.
There have never been any purely ideological warriors for the wonderful capitalist system.
(Poroskov) -- There have been known instances when a citizen of a western country who worked for the USSR for a long time and for whatever circumstances ended up living here with us became very disenchanted, even to the point that he could not fall asleep to the "music" of a dripping faucet and suffered from boorishness.
(Kirpichenko) -- Some went back and some adapted.
(Poroskov) -- Michael Souther, who took the name Orlov in the (Soviet) Union, in the early 90s committed suicide in the prime of his life. Did he not adapt?
(Kirpichenko) - He left relatives behind there. It could be that he expected to see something different here. It could be that the marriage he had here was unsuccessful. He was a frail man, a dreamer, very excitable, and he had a breakdown from the complete change in everything.
Nevertheless, when leaving this life he requested to be buried in a Soviet intelligence officer's uniform. He gave no reason to believe that he had become disappointed in his intelligence work.
(Poroskov) -- Are any of our intelligence agents in foreign prisons today?
(Kirpichenko) -- The Americans insidiously, posing as Russian intelligence agents, looked into our archives and approached former agents with whom they had not had contact and put them behind bars, including Robert Lipka, who was turned in by Kalugin. There aren't very many of them.
(Poroskov) -- Can anything be done for them?
(Kirpichenko) -- That is a forbidden topic. The only thing we can do for them belongs to the field of delicate intelligence technology. Starting from the post-war times and up until 1991, we helped out everybody, and nobody was left behind and forgotten. Back then the socialist countries also helped us.
(Poroskov) -- Apparently the only form of assistance available to an arrested agent is an exchange. Can anything be sent to him in prison?
(Kirpichenko) -- Lawyers could be hired and we could use political activists who are sympathetic toward Russia. In such a delicate affair as saving our people we have our own technologies, techniques and capabilities that shouldn't be mentioned even on the occasion of a holiday.
(Poroskov) -- Recently somewhere I heard a phrase that is offensive to the service: The SVR has become a restricted-access type information agency. Could it be that this was a hint that the only information coming in from aboard is information gleaned from open sources?
(Kirpichenko) -- We have in no way rejected acquiring sources for obtaining secret information. Maybe the people who make up such phrases mean that working with open information sources is acquiring greater significance. The Americans write that they obtain 80 percent of their intelligence information from such sources. As a man who has done a great deal of work "in the field" I can say that 5 percent of secret information more than covers the other 95 percent, but one must provide some general background -- and that is where working with open sources comes into play. If an intelligence agent doesn't have a handle on the situation in a given country, he cannot evaluate important information, it will go right over his head. Secret and open-source information is transformed into a kind of single whole.
(Poroskov) -- In his book 'The Craft of Intelligence,' Dulles back in the 40s wrote that someday radars would find agents like Mata Hari. Has his prediction that technology-derived intelligence would replace agent-derived intelligence proven true?
(Kirpichenko) -- What goes on in the mind of people who are making a final decision can't be picked up by any radar or laser. A man shares his thoughts with his surroundings -- that is where one must have a source in order to know his true plans. But when you have satellites that are capable of tracking an area all the way down to a square meter, the role of visual intelligence decreases.
(Poroskov) -- Before, people gladly went to serve in intelligence if for no other reason the fact that traveling abroad was exotic. One acquired the opportunity to make some money and buy some things with checks at the 'Beryozka'. Now that is available to practically everybody. Nevertheless, people are still coming to you. Who are they?
(Kirpichenko) -- Before it was indeed a very prestigious profession, and when we approached a person and made an offer, turndowns were a very rare occurrence. Then the banker's profession became more prestigious.
But the situation is changing and many young people are beginning to understand that state service is significantly more stable, and even though the pay is less, there are guarantees of another sort. There is also the question of the essence of the profession itself. What is an intelligence agent?
An international specialist, area specialist, linguist (the norm in intelligence is two languages), psychologist (from the second or third meeting he must figure out who that foreigner is standing in front of him), and cover work (diplomat, journalist, trade worker). He is a psychologically full-fledged man, intense, athletic, a hunter-tracker: He can walk out of the embassy, "sniff the air" and figure out if there is danger. An intelligence agent must be able to drive a vehicle, have excellent reactions, and be attuned to the fact that he could end up under police pressure, and he must be able to determine if he is under outside surveillance. If he can do all of that, then it could be an interesting profession.
(Poroskov) -- Intelligence is a dangerous business. And not only in the sense that one could get arrested or kicked out of the country. There are many stories about how people simply get beat up, poisoned and finally, have their windows bombarded with microwaves. Are you aware of any such instances?
(Kirpichenko) -- All of that has happened, but I would not say that it has happened on a massive scale. They have tried to take people out who in their view were especially dangerous, to include with the use of forceful techniques. When we meet with our partners from the other intelligence services we explain: in the interests of our national security we conduct intelligence work, but using civilized methods, since the law "On Foreign Intelligence" does not allow us to engage in any other form of work: pressure, using compromising situations, drugs -- only on the basis of the voluntary cooperation of the source. And we are counting on an appropriate reaction from our partners. In any event, we are not seeing an increase in forceful techniques. I cannot cite any such instances in recent years. The chiefs of intelligence meet amongst themselves, and after this it is difficult to make the decision to belabor one of their men.
(Poroskov) -- And when an intelligence agent "catches" someone surveilling him?
(Kirpichenko) -- Surveillance operatives don't like it when an intelligence agent taunts them, tries to break away from them or plays foolish games. They respect when an intelligence agent, if necessary, tries to drop out of sight delicately. At first, a person in front of a television camera is nervous, thrown off, but then he gets used to it. The same is true for outside surveillance. The spy's profession is dangerous, both with regard to its psychological stresses and stressful situations. A person with a weak psyche doesn't stay in this line of work for long. The world is little by little trying to get on the civilized path, the threat of direct nuclear confrontation has weakened, and there is seemingly no need to twist each other's arms, to throw people in prison and beat people in every situation. Although, in the East, where they live by a different set of rules, they don't pay much mind to heads and broken bones.
(Poroskov) -- Right now are there any people of the caliber of Rudolf Abel and Konon Molodyy (alternately spelled Conon Molody a.k.a. Gordon Arnold Lonsdale) working "in the field" and "in the cold?"
(Kirpichenko) -- Of course. There exists a kind of general misconception in this regard. Why did Abel and Molodyy become known to the whole world? Because both were betrayed by the latter and the other ended up in prison, and both were exchanged. Yet just a few years ago we buried a Hero of the Soviet Union under a pseudonym. Because his real identity could not be revealed: he had just finished his work. I would like to express a rebellious idea: it could be that among those who worked over there a very long time, were not exposed, returned to this country and died here quietly we could find some who have accomplished at least as much as those people you mentioned. I would call the great illegals Akhmerov and Zarubin great spies. But since there were no ecumenical scandals, trials, imprisonment and liberation surrounding them, they simply passed by unnoticed. And then journalists write: his motherland didn't appreciate him.
(Poroskov) -- The Americans have an intelligence community consisting of more than ten organizations. As they say, this allows them to coordinate their work without duplicating each other's efforts. Do we need such an intelligence community?
(Kirpichenko) -- We have an intelligence community within the framework of the Security Council, and it coordinates the work of the special services and gives the president recommendations as to how to develop them. But it is only supposed to exercise a coordinating role on very important issues - interaction, determining orientation, and assigning missions. The Security Council does not delve into the everyday concerns of each force structure or in concrete operational matters. Today there exists an understanding and known harmony between our special services. They are independent in making decisions and there is no nit-picking tutelage. With regard to the SVR being independent, there are more pluses than minuses. There are drawbacks in that there are now fewer contacts with the counterintelligence subunits on the associates' level. They have moved to the higher levels.
(Poroskov) -- Within the Russian government there is a structure that deals with financial monitoring. For some reason it is called financial intelligence. But it is not quite the same thing as intelligence, for example, in the US Department of the Treasury. Do we need something along that line?
(Kirpichenko) -- We have economic intelligence, which sees to it that our country is not drawn into any financial or economic adventures. I have not seen any materials on US financial intelligence for many years, so I do not have a very good idea about what they are engaged in. I think that it is a small structure. From history I recall that in the past the Department of the Treasury and financial intelligence at one time were assigned the function of providing personal protection to the president of the US. As concerns Russian reality, I do not have the foggiest idea of what financial intelligence should be. Should we have financial intelligence station chiefs? What should they penetrate? That would be an expensive venture.
I think that the tax people and the Accounting Bureau are sufficient.
Incidentally, they do come to us on occasion. Sometimes they have come to the wrong place, for example, if they want us to check out some small firm somewhere. We do not service private firms, just state institutions. If, for example, large deliveries of gas abroad are planned and they need to know the status of a certain large corporation, such information could be gathered by intelligence.
(Poroskov) -- Liberal politicians in Russia often express fears with regard to the fact that today in the authority structures there are many people from intelligence, starting from the president and the defense minister. What is your assessment of this?
(Kirpichenko) -- Read academic Sakharov, who said the following: in our country there is only one uncorrupted institution -- the KGB, where intelligence bureaucrats sit, but they do not steal. With this Sakharov helped the prestige of state security, since there is no way anybody would ever accuse him of being sympathetic to the KGB. Indeed, an intelligence bureaucrat's caste has formed. But I do not want to say that all among us were without sin, for there were also some with dirt on their hands. President Putin, when he appointed people from intelligence, apparently proceeded also from the notion that an intelligence agent is a realist, since his assessments of phenomena and events are sufficiently dependent on how objective his information is. In our Soviet past that is the way it was. An ambassador would be interested in seeing to it that our state's influence and credits flowed into the country in which he represented the USSR, or so that in the Kremlin they would accept a certain man. The chief military adviser would say: we need to arm the army of this country, add to that our advisers, and then we will better be able to influence events. The trade representative would cry: they say give us lumber, flour and oil; we will give more and this will revitalize trade. In other words, these people were engaged from the outset. But then the intelligence agent would provide negative information, often raising objections against all three.
Mining information and acquiring sources spares the intelligence agent from having to, as the French say, "chevaucher les chimeres" -- ride chimeras. Infatuation with ideas, sensations and fantasies for us is impermissible. An intelligence agent is never late: when meeting with an agent one must arrive not early, not late, but precisely at the appointed time, otherwise the meeting loses its meaning. I welcome the appointment of intelligence agents to government posts, because I know that nobody will lure them into questionable deals -- they are of a different nature.
(Poroskov) -- Intelligence is, of course, a serious matter. But you, for example, are known as a man with a fine sense of humor. Tell us something cheerful about intelligence...
(Kirpichenko) -- In our secret journal they publish professional jokes. I'll read you one from the time of the Afghan war: "He consciously participated in the gang, but he didn't understand its objectives and missions"; "Approximately 43 men were captured." During a meeting with the leaders of the intelligence service of a particular eastern country, a member of our delegation sat down at the piano and began to play a stirring piece. The guests were amazed: an intelligence agent, a general, and now suddenly he's playing an instrument like that! The head of the delegation thought that they had an identical sense of humor to our own and he joked that he used to be engaged in illegal work under the cover of a blind musician. "So, how is his vision now?" asked our partners. And here's Primakov's favorite joke. One illegal was called in by the chief who said, "You lucked out -- you're going to America undercover as a millionaire. After a few months of training the chief called him in again and said, "You know, your cover has changed -- now you're going as a one-legged pauper."
(Description of Source: Moscow Vremya Novostey -- Informative, small-circulation paper focusing on business and political news.)
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suka banget sama tempat-tempat yang berbau eropa timur....eastern bloc
lah....kiev, prague, tashkent, zagreb soalnya antik, dingin dan
misterius and romantic . 